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Abstract 
In an experiment we study market outcomes under alternative incentive structures for third-
party enforcers. Our transactions resemble an anonymous credit market where lenders can give 
loans and borrowers can repay them. When borrowers default, judges are free to enforce 
repayment but are themselves paid differently in each of three treatments. First, paying judges 
according to lenders’ votes maximizes surplus and the equality of earnings. In contrast, paying 
judges according to borrowers’ votes triggers insufficient enforcement, destroying the market 
and producing the lowest surplus and the most unequal distribution of earnings. Lastly, judges 
paid the average earnings of borrowers and lenders achieve results close to those based on lender 
voting. We employ a steps-of-reasoning argument to interpret the performances of different 
institutions. When voting and enforcement rights are allocated to different classes of actors, the 
difficulty of their task changes, and arguably as a consequence they focus on high or low surplus 
equilibria.  
Keywords: impersonal exchange, third-party enforcement, experiments, steps of reasoning, 
judges’ incentives, repeated interaction.  
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1. Introduction 
State enforcement—forcing parties to fulfill their obligations—makes impersonal exchange 
possible and has no good substitutes. In fact, it is required for impersonal exchange between 
anonymous parties, which is the hallmark of developed market economies (North and Thomas, 
1973; Granovetter, 1985; North, 1990; Seabright, 2004), as empirically examined by Hoffman, 
McCabe and Smith (2005). Lack of enforcement compels traders in developing economies to 
rely on personal exchange, wasting trade opportunities, as publicized by Hernando de Soto 
(1989, 2000) and measured by the World Bank Doing Business reports. Moreover, good 
substitutes for State enforcement do not exist. Relational contracts are infeasible for anonymous 
exchange and, when feasible, they require the abstention or “forbearance” of the State 
(Williamson, 1991), which often heavily constrains them through judicial rulings and mandatory 
laws so that relational contracts always operate “in the shadow of the law” (Mnookin and 
Kornhauser, 1979). 
Enforcement failure is possible because enforcers—both judges and lawmakers—enjoy 
substantial discretion. In a world of incomplete contracts, enforcers not only enforce but also 
define the obligations of the parties in a specific scenario—in a sense, they “complete” the 
contract ex post; and this double task makes it possible for them to disguise enforcement failures 
as contractual “completions”. At a deeper level, the State, as a sovereign actor, is always in a 
position of power over contractual parties. The risk of enforcement failure is therefore ever 
present, with judges potentially allowing contractual defaults or, generally, States failing to 
enforce contracts. Claims of such failures abound. For instance, weak enforcement of 
foreclosures by judges hinders mortgage lending in developing countries (Field and Torero, 
2006; Galiani and Schargrodsky, 2006), as farm foreclosure moratoria did in the 25 US states 
that enacted it in the 1930s (Alston, 1984).  
Given that enforcement failure can thwart markets, societies implement institutional 
arrangements to limit the discretion of enforcers and shape their decisions. Judges are generally 
restrained by judicial precedents and the possibility of appeals. Legislators are limited by 
constitutional rules. Specific arrangements also operate on both judges and legislators. For 
example, judges may be elected or appointed, and their careers may depend on seniority or on   2
merit assessments. Similarly, different political structures—for instance, allocations of voting 
rights, from limited to universal suffrage—might motivate legislators differently. 
These alternative institutional arrangements may produce different enforcement results based 
on two factors: allocation of enforcement rights and incentives. First, each institutional 
arrangement allocates enforcement rights differently within society. For instance, states may 
grant voting rights to an elite of property owners, to all males, or to all citizens. These 
differences in constituencies make lenders or borrowers, employers or employees, or landlords or 
tenants more or less influential in defining the degree of contract enforcement. In the 1930s, US 
states suffering the most severe farm distress were more likely to enact mortgage moratoria. 
Similarly, elected US judges tend to rule in favor of local businesses (Tabarrok and Helland, 
1999). Second, some institutional arrangements may provide decision makers with different 
incentive functions, linking their enforcement decisions to their personal compensation. So 
defined, incentives could predictably encourage or discourage enforcement.  
To analyze these issues, we designed an experiment with an economy composed of three 
classes of actors: “lenders,” “borrowers” and “judges.” Transactions between lenders and 
borrowers generate surplus. Hence the economy reaches a socially optimal outcome when 
everyone completes a transaction. Decisions are made sequentially and when borrowers do not 
return “loans,” judges can enforce repayment or accommodate default. We examine the 
consequence of allocating enforcement rights to one of the three classes while always giving the 
deciding class incentives for optimal enforcement.  
More specifically, our experimental treatments represent three institutional arrangements in 
which different classes of individuals hold the key decision rights. In the “GDP” treatment, we 
pay judges proportionally to the aggregate income of the economy. In contrast, in two 
“constituency” treatments (lender and borrower), we pay judges according to how close they rule 
to the average vote of their constituency class. In all three treatment, judges therefore have 
formal enforcement powers, as they are free to enforce or not, but in constituency treatments a 
different class of subjects controls enforcement in actual fact, which is why we will talk of 
allocating enforcement rights to different classes of subjects: to judges in the GDP treatment,1 
                                                 
1 For simplicity, we will be talking about “judges”, but the position of the members of this class is also close to that 
of legislators.   3
lenders in the lender constituency treatment and borrowers in the borrower constituency 
treatment.  
In all three treatments, the socially optimal outcome is an equilibrium—in other words, those 
holding enforcement rights benefit from promoting enforcement, because their personal 
incentives are aligned with aggregate efficiency. All relevant information to identify the socially 
optimal outcome is public. In two treatments (borrower constituency and GDP) other equilibria 
exist where enforcement is low and the market disappears; hence, there is an issue of 
coordination.  
We find that the degree of enforcement does depend on how enforcement rights are allocated, 
to the extent that when borrowers control judges, enforcement falls below the threshold that 
makes transactions profitable, and very soon no transactions take place and the market 
disappears. In the GDP treatment, judges’ enforcement is high and the level of transactions is 
close to optimal. We claim that these differences in enforcement are caused by differences in the 
difficulty of the problem in each treatment, which makes a particular outcome salient in a given 
institutional arrangement, but not in another.2 
 When we pay judges according to borrowers’ votes, borrowers control judges but are unable 
to grasp that it is in their best interest to ensure a minimum profit to lenders. They thus motivate 
judges not to enforce, judges follow suit, loans dry up and borrowers’ earnings are extremely 
low. In contrast, when lenders control judges, lenders encourage enforcement, the economy 
achieves full efficiency and borrowers end up better both in terms of absolute and relative 
income.  
Our experiment is a variation of the trust game (Berg et al., 1995) where choices are binary 
and there is a sort of final litigation stage as in Bohnet et al. (2001). We also used repeated 
interactions with random endings (Engle-Warnick and Slonim, 2006). To rule out the feasibility 
                                                 
2 There is evidence that people suffer cognitive failures in different domains (Tversky and Kahneman, 1974; Nagel, 
1995; Camerer, 2003). If enforcers suffer similar failures, the allocation of enforcement rights may matter. This 
concern may seem minor since enforcers are experts, such as judges and politicians. However, experts in other 
fields also suffer biases (McNeil et al., 1982). Furthermore, some studies find that judges suffer from “anchoring,” 
“hindsight,” “overconfidence,” “framing” and “representativeness” biases (Guthrie, Rachlinksi and Wistrich, 2001). 
As for politicians, their possible biases add to those of citizens (Westen et al., 2006), who ultimately drive the 
incentives of politicians. Furthermore, it is politicians who design the incentives of judges. Thus, the cognitive   4
of relational contracts (Brown, Falk and Fehr, 2003), we hid subject identifiers. In addition to 
this trust game, our study includes a guessing game to estimate subjects’ reasoning ability 
(Nagel, 1995; Costa-Gomes and Crawford, 2006) and a static game similar to Engelmann and 
Strobel (2004) to elicit subjects’ inequality aversion and altruism.  
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 presents the experimental design. 
Section 3 defines the theoretical predictions, detailing the different equilibria in both the one-shot 
and the indefinitely repeated game. Section 4 presents the main results of the experiment, chiefly 
that when borrowers enjoy enforcement rights they are trapped in an inferior equilibrium. 
Section 5 analyzes possible explanations for the main results. Section 6 concludes.  
2. Experimental design 
Overall, 189 undergraduate students from Purdue University participated in 15 sessions or 
“economies” (Table 1). Each session included three parts: part 1 measured other-regarding 
preferences, part 2 measured reasoning ability, and part 3, which constitutes the core of the 
experiment, had subjects interacting in a trust game with third-party enforcement.  
Part 3 was a repeated trust game between a lender (trustor) and a borrower (trustee) to which 
we added a judge (third-party enforcer, Figure 1). At the beginning of a session, 15 subjects 
randomly assumed a role, and 5 acted as lenders, 5 as borrowers, and 5 as judges—all of them 
retaining the same role until the end of the session. In period one, subjects were randomly 
partitioned into 5 groups. Each group included one lender, one borrower, and one judge, who 
interacted together for the period. After each period, groups were randomly rematched; subjects 
ignored the identity of the people in their group (stranger protocol). We will refer to a session as 
an economy.  
The modified trust game had the following five features. First, there was a built-in inequality 
in minimum earnings, which were 50 tokens for lenders, 16 for borrowers, and in-between for 
judges. An experimental token was worth $0.45. 
                                                                                                                                                               
dimension of the contract enforcement problem is ultimately defined by the ability of non-expert citizens to 
understand the problem.   5
Second, choices were binary. The lender (trustor) could either lend (send 10 tokens) or save 
(send 0), the borrower (trustee) could either comply (return 17 tokens to the trustor) or default 
(return nothing to the trustor), and the judge could either enforce or accommodate the borrowers’ 
default (Figure 1). The implicit wealth multiplier was 3.4 and final earnings for (lender, 
borrower) could be either (60, 16) for saving, (67, 33) for repaid trust, or (50, 50) for betrayed 
trust.  
Third, subjects knew the “social history” of their economy, which includes all subjects in the 
room, but did not observe individual decisions and could not therefore develop reputations. More 
specifically, a subject learned the past actions of economy participants in aggregate form and not 
the individual histories of the people in her group. At the end of each period, each subject 
observed not only the choices implemented in her own group of three subjects, but also the 
overall number of loans given in the economy and how many of them ended in default; the 
number of judges that chose to enforce; and the average earnings of lenders, borrowers and 
judges.  
Fourth, the decision of the judge was elicited with the strategy method: she made a decision 
every period, but the decision was implemented only when the lender had sent 10 tokens to the 
borrower and the borrower had defaulted. In all other cases, her decision was collected but not 
implemented. In addition, every period the judge was asked, with no money at stake, to state her 
beliefs about how many other judges in the economy (0, 1, 2, 3, or 4) chose to enforce. As we 
will explain later, in a given period all judges earned the same amount, which varied according 
to the performance of all judges or the performance of the economy. Hence, they had a strong 
incentive to look at the social history of the economy. 
Fifth, every period we asked lenders and borrowers to vote on what they would like judges to 
decide. These votes were labeled opinions in the instructions and might have payoff 
consequences for lenders and borrowers by influencing judges’ enforcement decisions in the 
constituency treatments, as will be clear later in the paper. The votes were given with reference 
to one generic judge in the economy, not specifically with reference to the judge matched with   6
each respondent. At the end of each period, the votes of all lenders and all borrowers were 
announced as part of the social history.3  
This modified trust game was repeated for at least 20 periods. After every period above 
period 20, a subject was asked to roll a dice. If the result was a six, the session was over; 
otherwise it continued. In expectation, this random stopping rule yielded 6 additional periods for 
a total duration of 26 periods. There were no practice periods. To preserve the inequality in 
earnings, only one period from part 3 was randomly selected for payment. 
Treatments. We introduced three main treatments that manipulated the payment schedule for 
judges: “lender constituency,” “borrower constituency,” and “GDP” (Table 1). A common 
feature of all three treatments was that judges were paid according to their collective 
performance, hence in a given period they all earned the same amount.  
Treatments differed in the compensation of judges:  
1)  In lender constituency, judges’ payments depended on the agreement between judges’ 
decisions as a group and lenders’ votes as a group. More precisely, if the number of 
judges enforcing was equal to the number of lenders favoring enforcement, judges 
earned 50 tokens. For every person in disagreement, judges’ earnings were lowered 
by 5 tokens. Hence, judges earned a minimum of 25 tokens. Borrowers’ votes were 
ignored. 
2)  In borrower constituency, judges’ payments depended on the agreement between 
judges’ decisions as a group and borrowers’ votes as a group. More precisely, if the 
number of judges enforcing was equal to the number of borrowers also favoring 
enforcement, judges earned 50 tokens. For every person in disagreement, judges’ 
earnings were lowered by 5 tokens. Lenders’ votes were ignored. 
3)  In GDP, judges earned the average of all lenders and borrowers in the economy. 
Therefore, what mattered was not just the earnings of the specific lender and 
borrower matched with that judge but the earnings of all 10 of them in the economy. 
Judges’ earnings could therefore vary between 38 and 50 tokens.  
                                                 
3 When voting, lenders and borrowers knew how many loans had been given and their earnings in the current 
period.    7
Within the borrower constituency and GDP treatments, we also implemented variants where 
some roles were replaced by pre-programmed computers. We refer to those as “robot borrower 
constituency” and “robot GDP,” and give a full description in the results section.  
In part 1 we elicited the preferences of all subjects with respect to equality and efficiency in a 
static context, along the lines of Engelmann and Strobel (2004). We showed each subject Table 2 
and Table 3 (without the last rows) and asked them to write their decisions on a personal card. 
Each table presented subjects a choice between alternative allocations of money among three 
persons (roles 1, 2, and 3). Subjects faced role uncertainty as they made these decisions because 
roles were assigned randomly at the end of the session. Participants were instructed to choose 
among options A, B, and C and then D, E, and F as if they knew they were Person 2. When 
computing earnings, we randomly formed groups and randomly assigned roles. Only the choice 
of the participant selected as person 2 mattered for deciding her group allocation. The choices of 
persons 1 and 3 were ignored. Half of the groups were paid according to choices made in Table 2 
and the other to choices in Table 3.  
In part 2 we ran a one-shot guessing game in which all subjects had to write a real number 
between 0 and 100 on their decision cards. They were informed that we would randomly form 
groups of three and would compute a target number for each group by taking two thirds of the 
group average. Within each group, the subject closest to her target number received 6 points, 
which were evenly split in case of a tie.  
At that point, the experimenter collected all decision cards and wrote the results for part 1 
and part 2 on the cards, which were returned to the subjects at the end of the session. After 
reading the instructions for part 3, subjects completed a quiz on the rules for part 3 and the 
subjects who made the most mistakes in the quiz were excluded. They received $10 in addition 
to their part 1 and part 2 earnings. A session included between 6 and 18 subjects (Table 1). Each 
subject participated in only one of the sessions between February and April 2006. Recruitment 
was done mostly in introductory economics classes. A session lasted on average less than two 
hours, including instruction reading. A participant earned on average $24, and earnings were 
paid privately at the end of a session.   8
3. Theoretical predictions 
We now derive the theoretical predictions for a rational, self-interested agent. In part 1 the 
best choice is C in Table 2 and F in Table 3. In part 2, the Nash equilibrium is to choose the 
number 0. The prize is split equally and individual earnings are 2 points. We will now derive the 
Nash equilibria for a simpler version of the experimental design used in part 34—both for a one-
shot game and then for the indefinitely repeated game described in the previous section. 
Remember that decisions are sequential: first lenders decide, then borrowers, and finally judges. 
We assume that all agents are risk neutral and maximize their personal earnings. At the end of 
the section, we will discuss changes in the equilibria of part 3 when agents are risk averse or 
other-regarding. 
3.1. Preliminary considerations 
The one-period version of the trust game described in Section 2 comprises five lenders (ℓ), 
five borrowers (b) and five judges (j). Each participant takes two decisions at most:  
   (Iℓk, Vℓk), (Ibk, Vbk), (Ijk, Gjk) for k = 1, ..., 5  
Participants’ main decisions are binary {0,1} and we represent them through a set of “I” 
variables; for instance Iℓ2 = 1, Ib5 = 0, Ij3 = 1 denotes that lender 2 gave a loan, borrower 5 
defaulted, and judge 3 forced the borrower to pay back. More generally, the first subscript of a 
variable denotes the role, while the second subscript identifies each of the 5 subjects playing 
each of the 3 roles, k = 1, ..., 5. For lenders and borrowers, the “V” variables represent their vote 
about enforcement, either 0 or 1. For judges, the “G” variables are the guesses about the number 
of other judges deciding for enforcement, and can therefore take any integer value between 0 and 
4. For example, when we observe Vℓ2 = 1, Vb5 = 0, Gj3 = 3, this means that lender 2 prefers a 
generic judge in the economy to enforce; borrower 5 prefers this generic judge to accommodate 
                                                 
4 For the theoretical predictions, we assume that (a) when making a choice, each judge knew how lenders and 
borrowers had voted; and (b) when voting, each borrower knew whether she had received a loan or not. On the 
contrary, in the experiment (a) judges learned how lenders and borrowers had voted only at the end of each period; 
and (b) before voting, borrowers did not know whether or not they were receiving a loan unless the number of loans 
was zero or five.   9
the borrower’s default; and, finally, judge 3 thinks that 3 of the other 4 judges in that particular 
economy would have enforced.  
In short, each participant first makes a choice about lending, compliance, or enforcement, and 
then states her opinion or guess on enforcement. The payoffs, {πℓk, πbk, πjk for k = 1, ..., 5}, which 
have already been explained in Section 2 and Figure 1, result from the interaction among 
subjects, taking into account who was matched with whom in the period. For specifying these 
interactions, we define functions m(k), which map each subject k to the other two subjects 
interacting with her.5 
Thus, the payoff of lender k ranges in [50, 67]: 
  πℓk  = 60 (1 – Iℓk ) + 67 ( Iℓk Ib,m(k)+ Iℓk(1 – Ib,m(k))Ij,m(k) ) + 50 (Iℓk(1 – Ib,m(k))(1 – Ij,m(k))   [1]. 
The payoff of borrower k ranges in [16, 50]: 
  πbk = 16 (1 – Iℓ,m(k) ) + 33 ( Iℓ,m(k) Ibk+ Iℓ,m(k) (1 – Ibk)Ij,m(k) ) + 50 (Iℓ,m(k)(1 – Ibk)(1 – Ij,m(k))) [2]. 
The payoff of judge k under lender constituency ranges in [25, 50]: 
  πjk = 50 – 5 Σk=1,…,5 (Ijk – Vℓk)   [3]. 
The payoff of judge k under borrower constituency ranges in [25, 50]: 
  πjk = 50 – 5 Σk=1,…,5 (Ijk –Vbk) [4]. 
And the payoff of judge k under GDP ranges in [38, 50]: 
  πjk = 1/10  Σk=1,…,5 (πℓk + πbk)  [5]. 
The economy can achieve the socially optimal outcome only when all lenders lend, as more 
loans increase the total earnings in the economy. We will rate outcomes according to what we 
label “surplus,” defined as the average payoff of all lenders and borrowers minus their initial 
endowment of 76 tokens (60+16). This surplus, which is a partial measure of social efficiency, 
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since judges’ earnings are excluded, will range for each transaction between 24 (“high surplus”) 
when all lenders lend, and 0 (“low surplus”) when all lenders save.6 
The best choice for a lender is to lend when her expected payoff is higher than it would be if 
saving, E[πℓk|Iℓk = 1] > E[πℓk|Iℓk = 0]. Because a lender is anonymously matched with a borrower 
and a judge in the economy, the expected profitability of lending crucially depends on the 
expected “enforcement rate” in the economy, ER, defined as the ratio between the sum of loans 
returned (both voluntarily by borrowers or after judicial enforcement) and the sum of loans 
given:  
  ER = [Σk Ibk + (Σk Iℓk - Σk Ibk) Rj ] / (Σk Iℓk) [6].7 
The expected return on a loan depends on how many are voluntarily returned by borrowers 
(Σk Ibk) and, for those on default, the enforcement rate by judges, Rj = Σk Ijk /5. We remain 
agnostic about how these expectations are generated. In equilibrium, however, expectations 
should be fulfilled. Lenders will lend only if they expect an enforcement rate above a certain 
Enforcement threshold, ER
*:    
 E[πℓk|Iℓk=1] > E[πℓk|Iℓk=0]  ⇔ 67 E[ER] + 50 (1– E[ER]) > 60 ⇔ E[ER] > E[ER
*] = 10/17 ≈ 0.5882 
Lending is profitable when more than about 58.82% of the loans are returned. This 
enforcement rate can be satisfied with various combinations of borrowers’ and judges’ choices. 
For instance, when at least three judges decide for compliance, the threshold is met for any 
number of voluntary returns. When at least three loans out of five are voluntary returned, the 
                                                 
6 In the GDP treatment, surplus is proportional to the GDP of the economy. In the other two treatments, it is not. In 
an actual economy, judges are a small minority of agents and hence surplus would be a good approximation of the 
GDP of the economy. 
7 Given that this ratio is used by lenders to estimate their return from lending, Ilk is at least one and the denominator 
is always positive. The risk attitude of lenders has a clear impact on the enforcement threshold [6] that is acceptable 
for giving loans. The more risk averse lenders are, the higher the threshold, ER
** > ER
*. This makes no difference 
for equilibrium in lender constituency, given the 100% enforcement rate in equilibrium. Instead, it makes some 
difference in the other two treatments, although not major ones. In borrower constituency, there are still multiple 
equilibria. More precisely, there is a high-surplus equilibrium, which is unique, although now lenders earn less. 
Moreover, there are multiple low-surplus equilibria, which are now a larger set than before. Under GDP, the set of 
high-surplus equilibria gets smaller because ER
** > ER
*, while the set of low-surplus equilibria gets larger.   11
threshold is met for any judicial ruling (also for 3/4, 2/3 or 1/1). When at least two loans out of 
five are voluntary returned, we need two judges ruling for enforcement, and so on.8 
3.2. Equilibria in the one-shot game 
Although subjects in the experiment face repeated interactions, we first analyze the equilibria 
for the simpler case of one-period interaction.  
In lender constituency, there exists a unique sequential equilibrium where all lenders vote for 
compliance. It is in the judges’ best interest to adhere to the lenders’ opinions and rule for 
compliance. Hence lenders can count on a 100% enforcement rate. It follows that all lenders 
have an incentive to give loans, while borrowers can choose any action. The key players here are 
the lenders, because they control the third-party enforcer. We will adopt the following notation to 
describe the aggregate outcomes in equilibrium, (Σk Iℓk, Σk Vℓk), (Σk Ibk, Σk Vbk), (Σk Ijk) = (5, 5), 
(0, -), (5), where the terms in parentheses highlight decisions of lenders (number of loans, 
number of votes for compliance), borrowers (number of voluntary returns, votes for compliance), 
and judges (number of enforcement decisions), respectively. The symbol “-” stands for any 
choice. We omit from the above description judges’ guesses about other judges, G, because they 
entail no payoff consequences in any of the treatments. The equilibrium is supported through a 
symmetric pure strategy and yields a high surplus outcome with payoffs πℓ = 67 for lenders, πb = 
33 for borrowers, and πj = 50 for judges. 
There is also a unique sequential equilibrium in borrower constituency, but it yields a low-
surplus outcome, which is not socially optimal. Now the key players are the borrowers, because 
they have control of the third-party enforcer. If lenders give loans, borrowers always have an 
incentive to default and to vote for default. Hence, in equilibrium, lenders do not give loans and 
judges accommodate. The equilibrium is supported through a symmetric pure strategy and 
generates aggregate outcomes (0, -), (0, 0), (0) with payoffs πℓ = 60, πb = 16, and πj = 50. Given 
that borrowers would benefit from receiving loans, one may suggest that they could “promise” to 
vote for loan enforcement. However, such promises are not credible because borrowers and 
                                                 
8 The enforcement threshold is met (ER>58.82%) with four loans when two loans are voluntarily returned and one 
judge rules for enforcement; with three loans, when one loan is voluntarily returned and two judges rule for 
enforcement; with two loans, when one loan is voluntarily returned and one judge rules for enforcement.   12
judges choose after lenders have already given the loan, and hence a “high-surplus” outcome is 
not an equilibrium.  
Under GDP, there exist multiple equilibria. When judges take a decision, their earnings have 
already been determined. That is the crucial point. For any pattern of lenders’ and borrowers’ 
decisions, self-regarding judges have no incentive to rule for either enforcement or default. One 
could assume that judges will choose randomly because it makes no difference to them. In that 
case, lending becomes unprofitable because an enforcement probability r = 0.5 < ER
* drives the 
economy to a low-surplus equilibrium. This equilibrium is supported through a symmetric mixed 
strategy and generates aggregate outcomes (0, -), (0, -), (5r) with payoffs πℓ = 60, πb = 16, and πj 
= 38. Alternatively, one could argue that a judges’ equilibrium strategy is always to enforce. In 
that case, lending is profitable and drives the economy to a high-surplus equilibrium. Judges 
have no incentives to deviate from this strategy. This equilibrium is supported through a 
symmetric pure strategy and generates aggregate outcomes (5, 5), (0, -), (5) with payoffs πℓ = 67, 
πb = 33, and πj = 50. Any level of enforcement from 0 through 5 can be an equilibrium.  
When judges have a preference for equality, the multiplicity of equilibria under GDP 
disappears. As we will see later, we find widespread empirical preference for equality of 
earnings, and that introduces a ranking among outcomes, which leads toward a low-surplus 
equilibrium. The equilibrium is supported through a symmetric pure strategy where no judge 
enforces, and generates aggregate outcomes (0, -), (0, -), (0) with payoffs πℓ = 60, πb = 16, and πj 
= 38. 
3.3. Equilibria in the indefinitely repeated game 
If the game is played repeatedly, new equilibria may appear because subjects consider the 
effect that their current decisions may have on the future decisions of all subjects. After the first 
20 periods of interaction, we use a random stopping rule with a probability 1/6 of continuing for 
at least another period. It follows that the overall expected length of the interaction is 26 periods. 
At any point in time, however, subjects expect that the interaction will continue for at least 6 
periods.   13
In lender constituency, playing the game repeatedly yields the same high-surplus  outcomes 
as the one-shot scenario, (5, 5), (0, -), (5). A unique sequential equilibrium in symmetric pure 
strategies still exists. 
In borrower constituency, multiple equilibria exist, which yield either high-surplus or low-
surplus outcomes. In the repeated game, borrowers need to balance the immediate gain they 
obtain by voting and inducing judges to accommodate against the future losses this will cause if, 
as a consequence, lenders will lend less in the following periods.  
The high-surplus equilibria exist because in the repeated game, lenders can “threaten” to 
switch from lending to saving in future periods unless borrowers ensure lenders a profit. The 
borrowers’ tradeoff is such that they benefit from voting for enforcement because lenders would 
react to the enforcement level going below the critical threshold by executing their threat and 
halting lending for at least t periods. To calculate t, let us compare the equilibrium earnings that 
borrowers get over a future of T periods in two situations—when they vote to maintain 100% 
enforcement and when (in the current period) they decide to switch to 0% enforcement. The 
following inequality must hold for any generic period,  
 E[πbk |Σk Vbk = 5] > E[πbk |Σk Vbk = 0] 
  33 T > 50 + 16 t + 33 (T – t)  ⇔  t
* > 50/17 ≈ 2.94  [7]. 
That is, borrowers always profit from voting for enforcement if lenders react to default by 
halting lending for three or more periods, which is always a viable option because their expected 
horizon is at least six periods.  
Formally, the high-surplus equilibrium in borrower constituency is supported by any mixed 
strategy with an expected fraction of borrowers voting for enforcement, r = ER
*. The aggregate 
outcomes in equilibrium, (5, -), (0, 5r), (3), have expected payoffs E[πℓ] ≈  60, E[πb] ≈ 40, and 
45 < E[πj] ≤ 50.9 Any r > ER
* is not an equilibrium because there is room for a borrower to 
switch—sometimes to vote for default and increase her expected earnings. Instead, for any 
r < ER
*, lenders make a loss and will all quit lending. 
                                                 
9 For borrowers employing a symmetric mixed strategy, r =ER
* and for judges adopting an asymmetric pure 
strategy of 3 always enforcing, E[πℓ]= 60.20, E[πb]=39.80, and E[πj]=45.83. In the text, we provide an indicative 
interval that contains expected payoffs when also using other strategies to support a high-surplus outcome.   14
The low-surplus equilibria in borrower constituency is supported by strategies with an 
expected fraction of borrowers voting for enforcement, r < 33/68. The aggregate outcomes in 
equilibrium, (0, -), (0, 5r), (k), have expected payoffs πℓ = 60, πb = 16, and 45 < E[πj] ≤ 50.  The 
parameter k is the expected number of judges enforcing.10 The one-shot equilibrium with zero-
enforcement is a special case. Notice that for r∈(33/68, ER
*), an equilibrium does not exist, 
because in this interval, a one-borrower switch in strategy from voting for compliance with 
probability r to voting with probability one will make lending profitable; hence, 4r+1 < 5⋅ER
* 
must hold. 
Under GDP, multiple equilibria exist, which yield either high- or low-surplus outcomes. The 
high-surplus equilibria are supported by strategies with an expected fraction of judges ruling for 
enforcement at or above the enforcement threshold, q∈[ER
*, 1]. The aggregate outcome in 
equilibrium is (5, -), (0, -), (5q) with expected payoffs 60 ≤ E[πℓ] ≤ 67, 33 ≤ E[πb] ≤ 40, and 
πj = 50.  
The low-surplus equilibria under GDP are supported by strategies with an expected fraction 
of judges ruling for enforcement, q, less than 33/68. The aggregate outcome in equilibrium is 
(0, -), (0, -), (5q) with payoffs πℓ = 60, πb = 16, and πj =38. The one-shot equilibria with zero-
enforcement are a special case. Notice that for q∈(33/68, ER
*), no equilibrium exists. In that 
interval, a one-judge switch in strategy from ruling for compliance with probability q to 
probability one will make lending profitable; hence, 4q+1 < 5⋅ER
* must hold.  
3.4. Equilibrium selection criteria 
While the equilibrium in lender constituency is unique, we have multiple equilibria in 
borrower constituency and GDP. We put forward possible selection criteria to solve the 
coordination problem that characterizes the latter two treatments in the indefinitely repeated 
setting. First we discuss Pareto-dominance and then the effect of other-regarding preferences.  
Under borrower constituency and GDP there are both low- and high-surplus equilibria. If 
subjects use Pareto-dominance as their focal criterion, they will avoid low-surplus equilibria, 
                                                 
10 That is, k=0 for r≤0.1; k=1 for 0.1≤r≤0.3; k=2 for r≥0.3. See also footnote 9.   15
which would leave only one equilibrium in borrower constituency (5, -), (0, 5r), (3) with 
r = ER
*, and a multiplicity of high-surplus equilibria in GDP. 
When subjects have other-regarding preferences, there may be two effects: first, the ranking 
of equilibria may be different from self-regarding subjects; and second, the equilibrium set itself 
may change. We will maintain the assumption that all agents have identical preferences, 
although now they may be other-regarding, i.e. exhibit a preference for efficiency, or equality, or 
both.  
A subject has a preference for efficiency if she is willing to pay a cost in terms of personal 
earnings in order to increase the aggregate earnings in the economy more than such cost. When 
everyone has a preference for efficiency, the equilibrium ranking coincides with the Pareto-
dominance criterion and the equilibrium sets of the three treatments do not change. In short, 
preferences for efficiency reinforce the focality of high-surplus equilibria. 
A subject has a preference for equality if she is willing to pay a cost in terms of personal 
earnings in order to increase the equality of earnings among the subjects in the economy, in 
particular to increase the absolute and relative earnings of the poorest persons in the economy 
(the borrowers). The closest model for our preference specification is Charness and Rabin 
(2002). The models of Fehr and Smidt (1999) and Bolton and Ockenfels (2000) are also related. 
As we will explain in the following sections, inequality aversion reinforces the focality of high-
surplus equilibria in all treatments. In addition, inequality aversion changes the equilibrium set in 
the GDP treatment. 
All low-surplus equilibria exhibit a higher inequality than all high-surplus equilibria, because 
the poorest subjects (borrowers) always earn 16 tokens in low-surplus outcomes (27% as much 
as lenders) and earn between 33 and 50 in high-surplus outcomes (49%–100% as much as 
lenders). Therefore, inequality averse subjects should be more likely than self-regarding subjects 
to coordinate on a high-surplus equilibrium in both the GDP and borrower constituency 
treatments. 
In addition, when subjects are inequality averse, the set of equilibria for GDP changes and 
becomes identical to the set in borrower constituency. While self-regarding judges regard all 
high-surplus outcomes equally, inequality-averse judges strictly prefer the outcome with the 
highest earnings for borrowers. As a consequence, GDP judges will choose the lowest possible   16
enforcement rate, r = ER
*, which becomes the only high-surplus equilibria. This change is 
particularly important because, on one hand, it simplifies the coordination task in GDP and, on 
the other hand, it makes GDP more comparable to borrower constituency.11 
Deeper changes in the equilibrium set may occur when all subjects have “strong” other-
regarding preferences.12 The unique equilibrium in lender constituency may shift to a different 
high-surplus outcome with an enforcement rate lower than 100%, although never to a low-
surplus outcome.13 The set of low-surplus equilibria in GDP and borrower constituency may 
shrink and may even disappear altogether.14 In conclusion, the likelihood of achieving a high-
surplus equilibrium is unambiguously enhanced if subjects are other-regarding. 
4. Main results 
We present two sets of results from the experimental data. The main findings are Results 1 
and 2, which report the differences obtained across treatments in the surplus generated and in the 
distribution of earnings, with particular reference to the fact that borrower constituency falls 
consistently into the low-surplus equilibrium. Second, Results 3 through 7 explore possible 
reasons for these main findings and settle on a bounded rationality explanation. 
                                                 
11 The change in GDP equilibrium set is independent from the “strength” of inequality-averse preferences; judges 
incur no cost to lower the enforcement rate as long as the economy remains in a high-surplus outcome. Moreover, 
the change is independent from judges having both a preference for equality and efficiency. 
12 One can measure the strength of other-regarding preferences using the willingness to sacrifice personal earnings 
in order to achieve an other-regarding goal. If a subject is willing to pay 2 units to increase the total earnings of the 
economy by 10 units, we then say that her “efficiency multiplier” is 5 or lower. If she is willing to pay 3 units to 
increase the earnings of borrowers by 18 units, we also say that her “equality multiplier” is 6 or lower. The stronger 
the other-regarding preference, the lower its corresponding multiplier. 
13 Inequality-averse lenders would drive this change. If a lender votes to accommodate borrowers, she can expect a 
cost of 3.4 (i.e. 1/5 ⋅17), which will result in a gain of 17 for borrowers. There is no sacrifice in terms of efficiency, 
and the equality multiplier is 5. 
14 Lenders with a concern for equality and/or efficiency would drive the change. For a lender, giving a loan entails 
an “opportunity cost” between 8.75 and 17, but will increase earnings in the economy by 34 and earnings of 
borrowers by an amount between 17 and 25.75. Given 0≤ ER <33/68, the cost for a lender is 17(1-ER) and the gain 
for a borrower is ER(33-16)+(1-ER)(50-16). The efficiency multiplier is in the interval [2, 3.9] and the equality 
multiplier is in [1.5, 1.9].   17
Result 1. Market surplus is remarkably different across treatments. In lender 
constituency, subjects reach 100 percent of the potential surplus, and in GDP they 
reach 69 percent, whereas in borrower constituency, they reach only 10 percent. 
Table 4 and Figure 2 provide support for Result 1. We define “market earnings” as the sum 
of borrowers’ and lenders’ earnings over all periods and all groups, and compute the “market 
surplus” subtracting from the market earnings the “market endowments” (that is, the sum over all 
periods and all groups of the 16 tokens that borrowers receive at the beginning of each period 
plus the 50 tokens that lenders receive). Judges’ earnings are irrelevant in these two indicators. 
Both indicators differ widely across treatments. In lender constituency, the steady-state 
market surplus is at its predicted equilibrium level of 100%. In borrower constituency it is only 
10%, close to the low-surplus equilibrium level of 0%, which suggests that subjects coordinated 
on their least-preferred outcome. In the GDP treatment, subjects, despite facing an equilibrium 
set similar to borrower constituency, manage to achieve 69% of the potential surplus, which 
suggests that they attempt to coordinate on the high-surplus equilibria. These differences are 
significant at a 5% level using a one-tail Mann-Whitney test.15 
On these and all the numbered results relative to part 3, we rely on statistics computed with 
reference to periods 11–20, which best represent the steady state. Data for periods 1–10 show 
some degree of learning—mainly by judges in GDP and by lenders in both borrower and lender 
constituencies. This learning makes the contrast between treatments less stark. For periods above 
20, comparisons between average values are distorted because the random stopping rule 
produced sessions of uneven length. Table 4 reports some basic statistics, including those for the 
“discarded” periods. Table 4 also includes the results for the two “robot” variants, which will be 
described after Result 4. 
                                                 
15 The p-values for different groupings of samples are: GDP vs. borrower constituency, p = 0.028; GDP including 
robots vs. borrower constituency including robots, p = 0.001; GDP only robots vs. borrower constituency only 
robots, p = 0.05. Although stark, differences with lender constituency are significant at a 10 percent level only 
because of the small sample size of lender constituency: vs. borrower constituency, p = 0.10; vs. GDP, p = 0.067.   18
Result 2. Borrowers earn their smallest share of market earnings under borrower 
constituency. The share is higher under lender constituency and GDP. The 
conclusion is similar when one considers borrowers’ absolute earnings instead of the 
relative share. 
Table 4, Figure 3 and Figure 4 support Result 2. Paradoxically, borrowers end up worse off 
under borrower constituency when they hold voting rights that command enforcement than in the 
other treatments. When lenders “control” judges, borrowers’ earnings are significantly higher 
both in absolute and in relative terms. Borrowers’ shares are 24.0% under borrower constituency 
vs. 33.0% under lender constituency, and borrowers’ absolute earnings are 18.8 vs. 33.0 tokens, 
respectively. In the GDP treatment, borrowers also fare well, enjoying a marginal increase in 
their share of earnings (33.2%) with respect to lender constituency, but suffering a small decline 
in their absolute earnings (30.8). These differences are significant at a 5% level using a one-tail 
Mann-Whitney test.16 
5. Explaining our main results 
We will now examine three conjectures to explain our main results 1 and 2: (a) other-
regarding preferences; (b) coordination problems; and (c) difficulties in understanding market 
interactions. This examination will show that other-regarding preferences and coordination 
problems do not reasonably explain our main results. Conjecture (c) best explains the data by 
employing a steps-of-reasoning model to capture the difficulties in understanding market 
interactions. 
                                                 
16 With one exception, the p-values for the comparison on either absolute or relative borrowers’ income are the 
same as for the comparison for market surplus. The exception is that there is no significant difference between 
lender constituency and GDP.   19
Result 3. Almost half of our subjects show some concern for equality of earnings and 
about half have some concern for overall efficiency. Only 21% of them are strictly 
self-regarding. 
Table 2 and Table 3 provide support for Result 3, which refers to all participants in part 3 
(21% is the proportion of subjects choosing C in Table 2 and F in Table 3). The presence of 
subjects with other-regarding preferences suggest that these preferences might have some effect 
on the main results obtained. In addition, as already noted in the theory section, the presence of a 
large fraction of subjects concerned for equality makes the equilibrium sets for the GDP and 
borrower constituency treatments identical. Note in particular that in any of the GDP sessions, 
there were either two or three judges with a concern for equality.17 
Result 4. Other-regarding preferences affect subjects’ choices but do not drive the 
differences across treatments in terms of market surplus and distribution of market 
earnings. When some roles are replaced by pre-programmed robots, the differences 
between borrower constituency and GDP treatments remain equally strong. 
Some of the evidence obtained in part 3 might also be driven by other-regarding concerns. 
For instance, lenders who lend when enforcement rates are well below ER
* could simply be 
concerned with efficiency or equality (Table 5). Similarly, judges who do not enforce in the GDP 
treatment could be reflecting their concern for equality. 
On the other hand, other choices are hardly consistent with other-regarding concerns. Most 
importantly, subjects in borrower constituency did not have the high-surplus equilibrium, which 
is also the most equal, as their focal outcome. In lender constituency, there is also no evidence of 
other-regarding behavior on the side of either lenders or judges. 
In order to fully rule out the impact of other-regarding preferences, we used two variants of 
the treatments where we kept humans playing as key actors but replaced the other humans with 
robots: 
                                                 
17 In one session, only two judges were concerned for equality, which implies that there are still multiple high-
surplus equilibria, although the set is much smaller than before, [0.588, 0.6] instead of [0.588, 1].   20
•  Robot borrower constituency: In a variation of the borrower constituency treatment, 
we keep humans as borrowers and introduce robot lenders and robot judges. Robot 
lenders will lend whenever they expect a profit. They base profit expectations on the 
past average enforcement in the market. Some lender robots consider only decisions 
made in the last period, while others consider up to four. Robot judges rule in perfect 
accordance to borrowers’ opinions. 
•  Robot GDP: In a variation of the GDP treatment, we keep humans as judges and 
introduce robot lenders and robot borrowers. Robot lenders are programmed the same 
as in the previous variation. Robot borrowers always default. 
Results are displayed in Figure 2, Figure 3, Figure 4, and in Table 4. In the robot variants, the 
five subjects in a session are the only ones paid; hence, concerns for efficiency are perfectly 
aligned with their own self interest, while concerns for other persons should have no impact. Yet, 
the differences between borrower constituency and GDP change only marginally from within 
human to within robot variant economies. The differences in terms of market surplus are 59 
(human) vs. 57 (robot) percentage points and in terms of share of market earnings are 9 vs. 7 
percentage points. We focus on these differences in order to maintain constant the behavior of 
lenders, which were humans in some cases and robots in the other cases because, as we explain 
immediately below, the naivety of our robot lenders is responsible for the higher market surplus 
achieved by humans in both robot variations.18  
In borrower constituency, market surplus increases from 10% in the human variation to 40% 
in the robot variation (Table 4). The main reason for this increase lies in our choice of backward-
looking robot lenders, which allowed borrowers to sustain a pattern of cycles of 
enforcement/lending switching into no enforcement/no lending and back to enforcement/lending 
throughout a session (Figure 5). Because of their design, robot lenders could be fooled 
throughout a whole session, while even the most optimistic human lenders seem to have 
understood the strategy after one or two cycles, and completely stopped giving loans (Figure 
                                                 
18 Specific other-regarding preferences cannot explain the results either. If subjects care only about the 50/50 
outcome, borrower constituency still fare badly in comparison to GDP (an average of 0.33 loans per period versus 
0.9). If borrowers are spiteful toward lenders, that could explain the results only when assuming an unrealistically 
high level of spite, because in the steady state a borrower must pay 17 tokens to lower a lender’s earnings by 7   21
6).19 As a consequence, while market surplus was stable over time with robot lenders, it steadily 
declined with human lenders. In addition, we still observed the paradox that borrowers’ absolute 
earnings were lower in robot borrower constituency than in robot GDP (Table 4). Borrowers in 
robot borrower constituency could have imitated the enforcement strategy followed by judges in 
GDP and achieve higher payoffs, but they. This fact also supports that subjects are boundedly 
rational with evidence that cannot be contaminated by other-regarding factors. 
As conjecture (a) is not supported by the data, we turn to conjecture (b). While lender 
constituency has a unique equilibrium, the other two treatments have multiple equilibria; hence 
subjects may coordinate their choices poorly. First, subjects’ choices could be badly coordinated 
with other subjects playing the same role, a failure that may affect borrowers’ voting in borrower 
constituency and judges’ enforcement choices in GDP. Result 5 addresses this issue. Second, 
within the borrower constituency treatment, judges could suffer a coordination failure in 
enforcement choices while matching the voting behavior of borrowers. Result 6 addresses this 
issue. 
Result 5. When some roles are replaced by pre-programmed robots, subjects readily 
solve any coordination issue. 
The two robot variants suggest that subjects playing the same role, judges or borrowers, 
coordinated successfully. In the robot GDP sessions, judges learn to coordinate on a high-surplus 
equilibrium (Figure 7). Their task is comparable to the one in the GDP variant with all human 
subjects. In the robot borrower constituency, although borrowers may appear erratic, they are 
actually coordinating on a more sophisticated pattern of cycles (Figure 5). In particular, 
borrowers behave anti-cyclically toward robot lenders. When robot lenders have given many 
loans, borrowers vote less frequently for compliance. Eventually the loans dry up, borrowers 
increasingly vote for compliance again, and then robot lenders start giving loans once more. 
                                                                                                                                                               
tokens. Evidence from other experiments (Levine, 1998) suggests that spite should not reach the degree required to 
take such action. 
19 The correlation coefficients between number of loans and borrowers’ opinions in the same period are –0.29 in 
borrower constituency and –0.44 in robot borrower constituency. Borrowers know the number of loans given in the 
period before stating their opinion about enforcement.   22
Result 6. Our judges responded well to the incentives provided by the institutional 
setup, learning to enforce in the GDP treatment and ruling closely to the voting of 
the relevant constituency in each of the constituency treatments. 
Support for Result 6 is shown in Figure 8 and Table 5. The judges in our experiment decide 
very differently in each of the three treatments, adapting very well to the different incentives 
given by each of them. First, under GDP, judges perform poorly in the first periods (they enforce 
on average 49.3% in periods 1–10) but learn to enforce transactions over time (the rate of 
enforcement increases to 69.3% in periods 11–20), sustaining the market and increasing the 
earnings of all participants. Second, under borrower and lender constituencies, judges on average 
rule closely following the opinions of their constituency, as shown in Figure 8.20 The 
transmission is perfect in lender constituency (i.e., judges always enforce), while it is close in 
borrower constituency, with averages of 1.5 borrowers voting for enforcement and 1.87 judges 
ruling for enforcement. This discrepancy would bias results in favor of the high-surplus 
equilibrium and hence judges in borrower constituency cannot be blamed for the low-surplus 
results. 
After having examined conjectures (a) and (b), we finally look at conjecture (c) in Result 7 
below. 
Result 7. The difficulty of actors to make multiple steps of reasoning provides a 
selection criterion to explain a high-surplus outcome in the GDP treatment and a 
low-surplus outcome in the lender constituency treatment.  
Although the main results in the GDP and borrower constituency treatments are compatible 
with the theoretical predictions of Section 3, subjects’ focal outcome was different depending on 
the institutional arrangement. We argue that the selection criterion is driven by the difficulty 
actors experience in making multiple steps of reasoning.  
We operationalize the cognitive difficulty of each treatment using two variables: (1) the 
number of steps of reasoning that the key actors have to make in order to predict market 
outcomes—specifically, the number of decisions to be made by other subjects and which the key   23
actors have to predict; and (2) the correspondence between the immediate impact and the distant 
effect of the choices made by the key actors. According to these two variables, we can rank 
treatments as follow:   
•  Lender constituency is an “easy” treatment. (1) Lenders are the key actors and face 
one step of reasoning (i.e. when voting, a lender has to predict how judges will 
decide). (2) Furthermore, lenders get an immediate benefit from voting for 
enforcement. Hence there is alignment between the immediate and distant impact of 
voting for enforcement in the current period.  
•  GDP is a “moderately difficult” treatment. (1) Judges are the key actors and also face 
one step of reasoning (i.e. when choosing on enforcement, a judge has to predict 
lenders’ reactions). (2) Judges face an additional difficulty, however, because their 
decisions have no immediate effect on earnings—judges’ incentives come from 
lenders’ reaction in the following periods. Hence there is a partial misalignment 
between immediate and distant incentives. 
•  Borrower constituency is a “difficult” treatment. (1) Borrowers are the key actors and 
face two steps of reasoning. When voting, a borrower first has to predict how judges 
will decide and, second, how lenders will react to judges’ enforcement decisions. (2) 
Furthermore, in the high-surplus equilibria, there is a stark conflict between 
immediate and distant effects, as enforcement could produce an immediate loss and a 
distant gain—by voting for enforcement, a borrower could indirectly cause an 
expected negative impact on her period earnings. 
When agents do an infinite number of steps of reasoning, the above ranking is irrelevant. Our 
subjects instead are characterized by a limited number of iterations of reasoning, which we 
measured in the experiment through the guessing game of part 2. As reported in Table 6, about 
36% did either zero or one step of reasoning. When subjects do a limited number of steps of 
reasoning, we predict that every time short-run and long-run incentives of the key actors are 
misaligned, their choices will be closer to their short-run incentives, which is exactly what we 
observe in the data (Table 5). 
                                                                                                                                                               
20 Furthermore, learning seems to happen faster than in the GDP treatment.    24
Empirical evidence at the individual level, provided  by the regression results shown in Table 
7 and Table 8, illustrate that the choices key actors made in part 3 depended on how many 
iterations of reasoning they completed in part 1. In the GDP treatment, judges with zero 
iterations of reasoning enforced significantly less than other judges. This pattern holds both for 
the human and robot variants of the GDP treatment and irrespective of whether we consider all 
periods of a session or just those where each judge’s decision was pivotal for reaching or not 
reaching the zero-profit enforcement threshold, ER
* (Table 7, columns 1, 2, 5). Judges also 
learned over time the need to be at least above ER
*. 
In the borrower constituency treatment, borrowers with zero or one iterations of reasoning 
voted less frequently for enforcement than other borrowers. This result is particularly significant 
in the robot variant (Table 8, columns 7, 8). There were two interesting differences in 
comparison with the GDP treatment, however. First, the cutoff was zero iterations for the GDP 
treatment and one iteration for the borrower constituency treatment, which directly mirrors the 
ranking of treatments’ cognitive difficulty that we gave previously. Second, there was no 
evidence of learning in the borrower constituency treatment. Although borrowers in borrower 
constituency adjusted in the correct direction to the observed voluntary return rates in the 
economy, the adjustment was insufficient to move into a high-surplus equilibrium, despite the 
remarkable incentives to do so. Although based on a small sample size, these regressions exhibit 
an overall pattern that points toward the difficulty subjects have in understanding the systematic 
consequences of their immediate choices within a market mechanism. Depending on the 
institutional arrangement, some of the outcomes in the equilibrium set were easier for subjects to 
achieve than others.  
6. Conclusions 
We designed an experiment to examine how different political and judicial institutions may 
fail to produce enforcement and thus make market transactions impossible. With enforcement, 
the market flourishes, without enforcement, the market disappears. We argue that this variability 
is caused by the difficulty of the social problem defined by each set of institutions. Our 
institutions allocate enforcement rights to different classes of people—classes that are defined by   25
their role as parties to a credit transaction, and for which understanding the systemic 
consequences of enforcement is more or less difficult. We observe that those institutions 
allocating enforcement rights to parties facing an “easy” problem with respect to enforcement are 
successful in supporting the market. On the contrary, markets disappear when the institutions 
allocate enforcement rights to parties facing a more serious problem with respect to enforcement, 
and this is irrespective of how much these parties could benefit from sustaining market 
transactions. 
Our experiment simulates a credit market with two transacting parties and a third-party 
enforcer. A series of anonymous transactions take place between rich lenders and poor 
borrowers, with pairs meeting at random in the economy. If no transaction takes place, a lender 
earns more than three times as much as a borrower. Each bilateral transaction always generates a 
surplus; hence, the economy reaches full efficiency when everyone completes a transaction. Each 
lender can lend to a borrower, and when the borrower voluntarily returns the loan, the surplus is 
split, with most of it going to the borrower. After this mutually beneficial transaction, inequality 
is reduced, with a borrower holding about half the wealth of a lender. When a borrower defaults, 
the judge (third party) can either force the borrower to repay the loan or accommodate the 
default. If the judge enforces repayment, the outcome is as with voluntary return. Instead, if the 
judge accommodates the default, the lender takes a net loss of the principal and the final earnings 
of the borrower are equal to those of the lender. In the economy, there is a panel of judges and 
every default is assigned randomly to one judge. Hence, when assessing the expected 
enforcement rate, lenders must consider the decisions of all judges in the panel.  
Lenders enjoy freedom to transact, as they are free to lend or not. Our judges also enjoy full 
discretion, as they are always free to enforce repayment or not, although they are paid differently 
depending on the institutional arrangement. We consider three alternative arrangements in which 
we allocate enforcement rights to different parties: in the lender constituency treatment, judges 
are paid according to lenders’ average voting on enforcement; in the borrower constituency 
treatment, according to borrowers’ average voting; and in the GDP treatment, according to the 
earnings of all lenders and borrowers in the economy. The key actors in each treatment—those to 
whom we allocate enforcement rights—are therefore voting lenders, voting borrowers, and 
judges, respectively.   26
In all treatments, these key actors always face individual incentives in line with high 
enforcement and full efficiency; however, the experimental results are mixed. Lenders did vote 
for enforcement and the economy reached full efficiency in the lender constituency treatment. 
Judges in the GDP treatment did enforce and ended up approaching full efficiency. In contrast, 
borrowers overwhelmingly voted not to enforce and, as a consequence, judges did not enforce in 
borrower constituency, so efficiency was extremely low in this treatment. Borrowers remained in 
an equilibrium where, paradoxically, their earnings were lower and income inequality higher 
than in lender constituency. 
We claim that these different results are driven by the varying difficulty of the problems that 
the key actors face across treatments. Lenders voting on enforcement face an easy task because 
voting for enforcement benefits them immediately and also helps sustaining future transactions. 
Therefore, immediate and systemic consequences coincide. In contrast, these two consequences 
go in opposite directions in borrower constituency, where, when asked to vote on enforcement, 
borrowers face a tradeoff between an easy-to-see immediate profit and a future systemic benefit.  
Our claim that the differences observed in enforcement levels are caused by differences in 
the difficulty of the problem created by each institutional arrangements is based on three 
considerations. First, concerns for efficiency or equality should move borrowers to vote for 
enforcement instead of accommodation. Second, when facing robot players instead of human 
agents, results are comparable. Results from robot treatments allow us to rule out a determinant 
role of other-regarding preferences and to discard coordination failure as an alternative 
explanation. Finally, we report econometric evidence linking decisions and steps-of-reasoning 
abilities at the individual level. We observe that those subjects iterations of reasoning in a 
separate task are the least likely to favor enforcement.  
The results are striking because all our decision makers, including borrowers, have incentives 
to enforce. In other words, all are interested in extending the market. We can therefore conclude 
that on our setup incentives are not an exhaustive criterion to design market-enforcing 
institutions. The key actors must also face a task they can handle easily. Consequently, the 
functioning of an impersonal market is fragile because some institutions pose agents problems 
that are too difficult, and their poor understanding of the systematic consequences of their 
decisions leads to enforcement failures that destroy the market.   27
The experimental methodology allows us to focus on enforcement of impersonal trade and 
remove many real-world details that could otherwise confound our findings. In particular, it 
allows us to rely on complete contracts, restricting the role of our judges to squarely enforcing 
the terms of the exchange without playing any role in defining them ex post. It also allows us to 
focus on third-party enforcement, ruling out self-enforcement and relational contracts.  
It is tempting to establish parallelisms between our treatments and different allocations of 
voting and enforcement rights in the field. At their most general, our treatments might be 
suggestive of different forms of democracy, in which the third-party enforcers (either the 
government, the judiciary, or both) are directly controlled by different social groups. Our results 
could thus contribute to the literature on the links between democracy, the rule of law, and 
growth (Barro, 1996). They also hint that certain forms of education might promote growth by 
alleviating the enforcement problem.  
When extrapolating from the experiment, one must keep in mind, however, the implicit set of 
assumptions about reality embedded in the specificities of the experimental design. In particular, 
our design of borrower constituency could resemble a malfunctioning democracy, but future 
work may reveal that the poor performance of borrower constituency is reversed by allowing 
communication, or by having borrowers vote before lenders decide to lend or not, or by letting 
borrowers implement some commitment device.  
Our GDP treatment can itself be interpreted as a commitment device because experimental 
voters cannot change the role and compensation of enforcers. It therefore resembles societies 
with effective separation of powers, especially those with (1) an independent judiciary where 
judges’ careers are uncoupled from the short-term desires of their constituencies; and (2) voters 
who are quite responsive to economic performance (the “It’s the economy, stupid” of the first 
Bill Clinton campaign). In the field, both of these institutions show varying performance, 
however, and this diversity might also result in the experiment if judges’ compensation were 
modified to resemble fixed judicial salaries or short-term political horizons.  
Last, our design of lender constituency apparently resembles an elitist democracy or an 
oligarchy of the sort prevalent in the 19
th century or more recently in some Asian countries.  It is 
left for future work to determine, however, the extent to which outcomes of the lender 
constituency treatment depend on our implicit assumptions about enforcement. Our experimental   28
subjects enjoy decision rights on the enforcement of contracts but cannot modify the 
endowments, because we implicitly assume perfect and cost-free enforcement of property rights 
(that is, endowments are not expropriable by political action). Were we to introduce more 
consistent assumptions about imperfect enforcement of both contractual and property rights, one 
may conjecture a tradeoff between both imperfections, making borrower constituency more 
effective and lender constituency less effective than under our assumptions.    29
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Table 1. Experimental treatments 
Treatments  Use of 
robots  Date 
Number of 
participants 
in parts 1 
and 2 
Participants 




12 Apr 06  18  15  37  Lender 
constituency  None 
18 Apr 06  18  15  29 
2 Mar 06  15  15  22 
7 Mar 06
* 18  15  37  None 
8 Mar 06  18  15  25 
3 Mar 06  6  5  30 
23 Feb 06






judges  26 Apr 06  6  5  29 
GDP   28 Feb 06  15  15  27 
  1 Mar 06  15  15  24 
  9 Mar 06  18  15  22 
 
None 
19 Apr 06  18  15  23 
  19 Feb 06  6  5  35 





borrowers  24 Apr 06  6  5  23 
Totals    15 sessions  189  165  26.9  
(average) 
Notes: part 1: Static preferences for efficiency and equity; part 2: Guessing game; part 3: Judicial enforcement of 
transactions. 
*A $4 show-up fee was paid in these sessions and no show-up fee was paid in all other sessions   32
Table 2. Preferences for equality 
Earnings options   
A B  C 
Person 1  8.0  11.0  12.0 
Person 2 (decision-maker) 8.0  8.5  9.0 
Person 3  8.0  4.5  3.0 
Total points  24  24  24 
Frequency of choices,  







Notes: Self-regarding agents should choose C.  
The table includes subjects that participated in part 3 only.   33
Table 3. Preferences for efficiency 
Earnings options   
D E  F 
Person 1  20.5  12.0  7.5 
Person 2 (decision-maker) 6.5  7.0  7.5 
Person 3  5.0  5.0  5.0 
Total points  32  24  19 
Frequency of choices,  







Notes: Self-regarding agents should choose F.  
The table includes subjects that participated in part 3 only.   34
Table 4. Market surplus and the distribution of market earnings by treatment 
  









Market surplus  
(min 0%, max 100%):           
Periods  1–10  57.5% 23.3% 86.0% 68.0% 38.0% 
Periods  11–20  69.0% 10.0% 100.0%  96.7% 40.0% 
Session average
*  66.2% 13.1% 95.8% 86.4% 37.6% 
Borrowers’ share of market  
earnings (min 21%, max 50%):       
Periods  1–10  34.4% 27.8% 33.3% 32.7% 28.4% 
Periods  11–20  33.2% 24.0% 33.0% 36.9% 30.0% 
Session average
*  34.1% 24.9% 33.1% 36.0% 29.1% 
Absolute earnings of borrowers  
(min 16, max 50 tokens):       
Periods  1–10  30.96 22.69 32.15 30.28 24.39 
Periods  11–20  30.79 18.83 33.00 36.63 25.75 
Session average
*  31.37 19.68 32.74 34.78 24.84 
Notes: Surplus is defined as the average payoff of all lenders and borrowers minus their initial endowment of 76 
tokens (60+16). The average number of loans can be obtained by dividing the market surplus by 20%, i.e. 
100%/20% equals 5 loans. 
* All periods.    35
Table 5. Levels of enforcement decisions by judges and voting by lenders and borrowers 
 









Enforcement rate, both  
voluntary and judicial:
 †       
Periods  1–10  49.3% 33.8% 90.2% 71.0% 35.3% 
Periods  11–20  69.3% 37.0% 100.0%  73.9% 36.6% 
Session  average  62.2% 38.5% 97.3% 70.9% 35.7% 
Voluntary compliance by 
borrowers:       
Periods  1–10  7.3% 8.9% 22.2%  0.0% 14.4% 
Periods  11–20  13.7% 13.3% 11.0% 0.0%  23.2% 
Session  average  10.9% 15.3% 17.1% 0.0%  19.5% 
Judges’ enforcement and lenders’ 
and borrowers’ voting       
Judges  enforcing  3.10 1.87 5.00 3.73 1.93 
Lenders voting for enforcement  4.43  3.27  5.00
* n/a  n/a 
Borrowers voting for enforcement  0.85  1.50
* 0.70  n/a  1.93 
Equal borrower/lender outcome:
^^        
Periods  1–10  1.53 0.80 0.45 0.80 0.97 
Periods  11–20  0.90 0.33 0.00 1.23 1.17 
Session  average  1.21 0.43 0.14 1.21 1.05 
Notes: 
† The lender zero-profit threshold is ER
* = 58.8%. 
* Votes had payoff consequences for judges. 
^^ Average number of 50/50 split earnings per period.   36
Table 6. Guessing game and iterations of reasoning 
Iterations of  
reasoning 
Choice in the  
guessing game 
Number of  
subjects  % 
0 [66.67,  100]  23  13.9% 
1 (44.45,  66.67]  37  22.4% 
2 (26.63,  44.45]  64  38.8% 
3 or more  [0, 26.63]  41  24.9% 
Totals [0,  100]  165  100% 
Notes: Choices from part 2 of the experiment, classified as in Nagel (1995), with all subjects that participated in part 
3 included. Each subject had to guess a target equal to two thirds of the average of three real number targets guessed 
by herself and two other subjects between 0 and 100. The Nash equilibrium is zero.   37
Table 7. Judges’ decisions in the GDP treatment 
(Dependent variable: 1 = judge ruled for enforcement, 0 = otherwise) 















variables:  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
-0.5323 -  -0.5157 - - -  Voluntary return rate in 
previous period  (0.4583)   (0.4322)     
-1.5542 -0.9755  -  - 
†  -  Dummy equal 1 for 
subjects with zero 
iterations of reasoning 
(0.3612)
*** (0.3253)
***       
-  - 0.0182  0.2404  - -0.8881  Dummy equal 1 for 
subjects with zero or one 
iterations of reasoning 
   (0.3561)  (0.4250)    (0.6932) 
1/period  -2.6695 -0.5741 -2.5952 -0.5725 -1.3816 -1.1345 
  (0.9341)
*** (0.6138)  (0.9092)
*** (0.6141)  (0.4969)
*** (0.4748)
** 
Constant  0.6696 0.0589 0.3971 -0.0368  1.1877 1.3301 
  (0.3653)
*  (0.3598) (0.3687) (0.4246) (0.6194)
* (0.7252)
* 
No.  obs.  460 210 460 210 370 390 
No.  subjects  20 20 20 20 15 15 
Notes: Probit regressions (in columns) with robust estimator clustered around individuals. Pivotal periods are those in which each 
judge’s decision was pivotal for reaching or not reaching the zero-profit enforcement threshold, ER
*. 
† Regressor dropped because 
it perfectly predicted ruling against enforcement (structural zeroes). When (6) is run on only pivotal periods (regression not 
included in this table), the dummy variable for iterations of reasoning also dropped because of structural zeroes. Session dummies 
are included in the regression but not reported in the table. Period 1 excluded in (1) and (3) because of the lag regressor. 
* Significant at 10%; 
** significant at 5%; 
*** significant at 1%.    38
Table 8. Borrowers’ voting in borrower constituency 
(Dependent variable: 1 = borrower voted for enforcement, 0 = otherwise) 
    




















only  Independent  
variables:  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
-0.2265 -  -0.2297  -  -0.7765 -  -0.8834 -  Voluntary return rate  
in previous period  (0.3980)    (0.3978)    (0.4485)
*   (0.4956)
*  
-0.3056 
†  - - -0.6768  -1.2462  - -  Dummy equal 1 for 
subjects with zero 
iterations of reasoning 
(0.1979)       (0.5717)  (0.6769)
*    
- -  0.1802  -0.2113  -  -  -1.0734  -1.0814  Dummy equal 1 for 
subjects with 0 or 1 
iterations of reasoning 
   (0.3127)  (0.5996)      (0.3443)
*** (0.4573)
** 
1/period  -0.1037 -0.3766 -0.0735 -0.3317 0.6865  0.9692  0.7510  1.0791 
  (0.9532) (0.4944) (0.9377) (0.4462) (0.8853) (1.1841) (0.9513) (1.2288) 
Constant  -0.9359 -0.3591 -1.0268 -0.6105 0.2212  -0.1199 0.9760  0.4949 
  (0.3275)
*** (0.2805)  (0.3288)
*** (0.3414)
* (0.3869)  (0.4761)  (0.3837)
** (0.5236) 
No.  obs.  405 148 405 160 380 190 380 190 
No.  subjects  15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 
Notes: Probit regressions (in columns) with robust estimator clustered around individuals. Pivotal periods are those in which each 
borrower’s decision was pivotal for reaching or not reaching the zero-profit enforcement threshold, ER
*. 
† Regressor was dropped 
because it perfectly predicted ruling against enforcement (structural zeroes). Session dummies are included in the regression but 
not reported in the table. Period 1 excluded in (1), (3), (5), and (7) because of the lag regressor. 
* Significant at 10%; 
** significant 
at 5%; 
*** significant at 1%.   39










Lender’s earnings:     60 – 10 + 17 = 67
Borrower’s earnings:  16 + 34* – 17 = 33
60 – 10 + 0 = 50
16 + 34* –0  =  5 0
60 – 0 + 0 = 60









Lender’s earnings:     60 – 10 + 17 = 67
Borrower’s earnings:  16 + 34* – 17 = 33
60 – 10 + 0 = 50
16 + 34* –0  =  5 0
60 – 0 + 0 = 60
16 + 0 – 0 = 16 Earnings: 
Lender  60-10+17=67    60-10+17=67      60-10+ 0=50              60- 0+ 0=60 
Borrower  16+34-17=33    16+34-17=33      16+34- 0=50              16+ 0- 0=16   
Judge  πjk (depends    πjk (depends      πjk (depends              πjk (depends  
on treatment)    on treatment)      on treatment)              on treatment)   40










































Notes: Periods 11–20 only. Aggregate surplus is zero with zero loans and reaches its full potential with five loans   41














































Note: Periods 11–20 only   42
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Figure 7. Time profile of robot GDP sessions 
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Notes: Periods 11–20 only. In bold, opinions with payoff consequences.  